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Chapter l1's New Ten-Ton Monster:
The PBGC and Bankruptcy*
Daniel Keating**
Probably the main reason that the existence of the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) raises so many distinct
issues when pension plan sponsors go bankrupt is that the
PBGC wears so many different hats. The PBGC is at once a
representative of the federal government as well as a regulator
and insurer. At least two of its roles involve contradictory im-
pulses. Thus, as regulator, the PBGC plays a role in ensuring
that pension plans are properly funded.' In helping to influ-
ence how strictly funding standards are to be enforced, how-
ever, the PBGC must consider what effect more aggressive
enforcement efforts will have on the number of companies that
remain a part of the PBGC pension system.2
* © Daniel Keating 1993.
** Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law;
B.A. 1983, Monmouth College; J.D. 1986, University of Chicago.
Substantial portions of this article will appear as part of a treatise on
bankruptcy and employment law that is scheduled to be published by Little,
Brown and Company in 1994. I am grateful to the Israel Treiman Faculty Fel-
lowship for research support in connection with this article.
1. Technically, the Department of Labor enforces the funding provisions,
fiduciary standards and other requirements of title I of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the statute which generally gov-
erns the creation and maintenance of pension plans by employers. The PBGC
exercises its influence in enforcing funding obligations through its statutory
power to terminate plans. See Frank Cummings, Labor Relations and ERISNA
Considerations in Corporate Change (Mergers, Acquisitions, Bankruptcy), in
ALI-ABA RESOURCE MATERiALs: LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 1787, 1812
(6th ed. 1992).
2. For example, Congress has shown in its amendments to the termina-
tion standards of ERISA a desire to "balance the need to limit access to the
insurance system to cases of genuine need against the danger of making the
tests so stringent that nothing short of total liquidation would qualify for
PBGC assistance." H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 49 (1985),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 685, 707; see also Ellin Rosenthal, PBGC Pre-
mium Hikes Assailed, 49 TAX NOTEs 263, 264 (1990) (noting decline in the
number of defined benefit plans and quoting experts who claim that an at-
tempt to save the PBGC through premium increases could do the agency more
harm than good because of those who might drop out as a result); Ellin Rosen-
thal, OMB Proposal to Shield Government from Future Bailouts Has Benefits
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Similarly, as pension insurer, the PBGC must take seri-
ously its role as the final safety net for workers' pensions, a
role that counsels in favor of the most comprehensive coverage
of pension benefits. The PBGC, however, must also be cogni-
zant of the "moral hazard" that its insurance function creates
for employers within the system.3 Put simply, the PBGC must
make certain that its insurance program does not become a cor-
porate welfare program for companies that make grandiose but
empty pension promises to their employees. 4
In its third role, as a federal government instrumentality,
the PBGC has political clout that even retirees as a group lack.
Particularly since the savings and loan bailout, Congress has
taken the PBGC's bankruptcy reform proposals seriously.5
The statute that created the PBGC, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),6 creates further
complexities in relation to the PBGC and bankruptcy.7 ERISA
Community on Edge, 48 TAX NOTES 1080, 1081 (1990) [hereinafter Rosenthal,
OMB Proposal] (citing warnings from the director of a private pension plan as-
sociation that attempts to improve the PBGC's position in bankruptcy would
cause many employers to terminate their plans).
3. For a detailed discussion of the moral hazard problem in the context
of the PBGC insurance system, see Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bank-
ruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 WIs. L. REV. 65, which argues that the PBGC
is ill-equipped to monitor pension funding. Portions of the ensuing text and
notes are adapted from this article and reprinted with permission. See also
James B. Lockhart, Securing the Pension Promise, 43 LAB. L.J. 195, 198 (1992)
(noting that the PBGC faces the same moral hazard that the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation did: "Since PBGC is providing the pension
safety net, companies can spend their resources on things other than pension
plans, without receiving pressure from workers.").
4. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL INSURANCE OF PRIVATE
PENSION BENEFITS 47-48 (1987) (asserting that the current premium structure
results in sponsors of well-funded plans subsidizing pensions of financially
weak sponsors with underfunded plans). But see Michael S. Gordon, Dissent-
ing Comments to RICHARD IPPOLITO, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSION INSURANCE
264 (1989) (arguing that the only "authentic explanation" for the enactment of
the ERISA and PBGC insurance program was Congress's desire to create a
cross-subsidy system).
5. See Agency's Losses Growing Rapidly, Reforms Needed, Bipartisan
Panelists Say, 19 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1479, 1479 (Aug. 17, 1992).
6. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 5, 18, 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
7. See Stuart N, Alperin et al., Note, The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 539 (1975).
See generally SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EM-
PLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 142-43, 538, 762, 3525-26
(Comm. Print 1976) (revealing how Congress struggled with the problem of
the PBGC and bankruptcy in enacting ERISA).
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is an intricate statutory maze in its own right, and its intersec-
tion with the Bankruptcy Code has raised a number of issues
that are still far from settled.
The most important of these unresolved issues, and the
source of the most hotly contested litigation concerning the
PBGC and bankruptcy, has been the size and priority of the
PBGC's claims against debtors who have underfunded their
pension plans. Accordingly, this Article focuses primarily on
the legitimacy of the PBGC's various arguments for either se-
cured status or an unsecured priority position in bankruptcy.
The first part of this Article gives a brief overview of pensions,
ERISA and the PBGC, and explores why the PBGC currently
suffers from a huge financial deficit. Part II looks at the differ-
ent types of claims that the PBGC may assert in bankruptcy, as
well as the complex issues surrounding valuation of the
PBGC's claims. Part III then discusses the viability of the
PBGC's many arguments for why it deserves preferred treat-
ment in bankruptcy. Part IV explores how bankruptcy's auto-
matic stay affects the PBGC. The Article concludes that none
of the PBGC's arguments for preferred treatment are viable,
and further notes that if the PBGC wishes to remedy its cur-
rent problems in bankruptcy, it should seek a legislative solu-
tion under ERISA, not the Bankruptcy Code.
I. A PBGC PRIMER
Before getting to the complicated issues that arise with un-
derfunded pension plans in bankruptcy, it is useful to examine
first some background of the PBGC. The ERISA statute that
created the PBGC is complex enough to warrant entire trea-
tises that do not even discuss the bankruptcy aspects of the sub-
ject.8 The material that follows is thus necessarily an overview,
highlighting only those features of pension law that become
most relevant when insured firms go bankrupt.
A. PENSIONS, ERISA, AND =E PBGC
Pensions are generally of two types: "defined benefit"
plans and "defined contribution" plans. A defined benefit plan
promises to pay a retired employee an annual pension typically
based on the employee's salary and years of service.9 Most pen-
8. See, e.g., MARTIN WALD & DAVID E. KENTY, ERISA: A CoipaREHEN-
SITE GUIDE (1991).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1988); see also Harold S. Novikoff & Beth M.
Polebaum, Pension-Related Claims in Bankruptcy Code Cases, 40 Bus. LAw.
1993]
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sion plans are defined benefit plans.10 In a defined contribution
plan, the employer contributes a percentage of an employee's
income to a separate account, and the employee is entitled to
the balance in the account at retirement. 11
Title IV of ERISA covers most defined benefit plans that
private employers provide, but not defined contribution plans.12
There is little reason for the federal pension insurance program
to cover defined contribution plans because employers fulfill
such funding obligations when they make contributions. Under
defined benefit plans, in contrast, a plan sponsor meets its obli-
gation when the participant's benefits are paid fully or it
purchases an annuity contract on behalf of the participant.'3
Title IV of ERISA provides for a mandatory government
insurance program administered and enforced by the PBGC, a
wholly-owned United States government corporation modeled
after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.14 One pur-
pose of title IV is to ensure that the termination of un-
derfunded pension plans will not deprive employees and their
beneficiaries of retirement benefits.15 The PBGC provides pen-
373, 375 (1985) (describing types of pension plans). There are two basic types
of defined benefit plans: single-employer plans and multi-employer plans.
Single-employer plans are those with only a single contributing sponsor. 29
U.S.C. § 1002(41) (Supp. 1I 1991). Multi-employer defined benefit plans are
those maintained by more than one sponsor pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement, and to which more than one employer is obligated to contribute.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
10. James G. Durfee, ERISA Overview, in PENSION AND WELFARE BENE-
FITS IN BANKRUPrcY 33, 37 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. 444, 1988).
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1988 & Supp. m 1991); see also Frank H. Mc-
Culloch et al., ERISA Pension Claim in Bankruptcy, in PENSION AND WEL-
FARE BENEFITS IN BANKRuPTcy, supra note 10, at 203, 206 (describing the
significant features of defined contribution plans).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. I1 1991); CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 4, at 5.
In addition to PBGC insurance, employers receive tax benefits when they
create ERISA-qualified pension plans. Contributions to a qualified plan are
deductible from the employer's gross income, yet employees recognize no taxa-
ble income until benefits are actually paid on retirement or other separation
from service. See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 402(a), 404 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992). Fur-
thermore, income earned on contributed amounts accumulates tax-free. See 26
U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988).
13. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 4, at 5.
14. See 120 CONG. REc. 29,950 (1974) (statement of Sen. Bentsen). The
PBGC's board of directors includes the secretaries of Labor, Treasury and
Commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1988).
15. Congress created the PBGC "to provide for the timely and uninter-
rupted payment of pension benefits to participants and beneficiaries under [af-
fected] plans." 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2) (1988); see also Pension Benefit Guar.
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sion insurance to some forty million Americans in 85,000 pri-
vate defined benefit plans.16
When a plan covered by title IV of ERISA terminates with
insufficient assets to pay guaranteed pension obligations, the
PBGC assumes control and pays most benefits vested at termi-
nation.17 The main limitation on the scope of the PBGC's in-
surance coverage is that the agency may not pay any plan
benefits that amount to more than $750 per month in 1974 dol-
lars-$2352.27 per month in 1992 dollars--even if the benefici-
ary would have been entitled to more under the origina plan.' 8
Other principal limitations are that the insurance will not cover
benefit increases that resulted from plan amendments adopted
within the five years prior to termination, and that employees
do not continue to accrue benefits after plan termination.19 De-
spite these coverage limitations, about eighty-five percent of
participants in terminated plans ultimately receive all of the
benefits they were promised.20
To fund the cost of such benefits, the PBGC first looks to
any assets in the underfunded plan and then makes up the
shortfall with its own funds,21 which are accumulated primarily
from premiums paid by employers that maintain ongoing
plans.22 The insurance program also receives funds through
the statutory claim for unfunded benefits that the PBGC has
against employers that terminate their pension plans.23 Since
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720 (1984) (explaining that Congress
intended to ensure that workers would receive defined pension benefits prom-
ised by employers). The other two purposes of title IV of ERISA are to "en-
courage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans
for the benefit of their participants" and to "maintain premiums ... at the
lowest level consistent with carrying out [the PBGC's statutory] obligations."
§ 1302(a)(1), (3).
16. Lockhart, supra note 3, at 195.
17. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3)(B) (1988); Kenn B. Tacchino, Concerns with
Pension Security, J. Am. Soc. CLU & CHFC, May 1992, at 86, 86.
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(6) (1988); PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP.,
PROMISES AT RISK 17 (1987), reprinted in PBGC Proposal to Initiate a Varia-
ble Rate Premium System; and Public Comments on Administration's Pension
Plan Funding and Premium Rate Proposals: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
25 (1987).
20. See Lockhart, supra note 3, at 195.
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
22. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1306, 1307 (1988 & Supp. II 1991).
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (1988 & Supp. I1 1991). ERISA provides that
the PBGC may recover its claim not only against the terminating employer,
but also against members of that employer's "controlled group." 29 U.S.C.
19931
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1987, such terminating businesses have been responsible for the
PBGC's full costs in assuming their pension plans.2
4
Pension plans covered by title IV may terminate either vol-
untarily or involuntarily. A voluntary termination takes one of
two forms, standard or distress. A standard termination is a
voluntary termination in which the employer's plan has suffi-
cient assets to cover all obligations to plan participants.25 A
standard termination does not implicate the PBGC's insurance
function.
A distress termination, in contrast, is a voluntary termina-
tion in which an employer with an underfunded pension plan
can demonstrate to the PBGC that it is in financial distress.
26
The PBGC will allow a distress termination if: the terminating
company is in liquidation proceedings; the company is in a reor-
ganization proceeding and the bankruptcy court determines
that absent a termination, the company will be unable to sur-
vive outside of bankruptcy; or the PBGC determines either that
the company will go out of business unless its plan is termi-
nated or that providing pension coverage has become unduly
burdensome solely by reason of a declining work force.27
The PBGC also has the ability to terminate a plan involun-
tarily if it can make a showing of proper cause. Proper cause
for an involuntary termination includes the plan's failure to
meet minimum funding standards, the plan's inability to pay
benefits when due, or a situation presenting possible long-term
loss to the PBGC.28 If the PBGC's decision to terminate is con-
tested, district court approval is required.29
§§ 1301(a)(14)(A), 1362(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The "controlled group" in-
cludes all entities under "common control" as determined under regulations
issued pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 414(b)-(c),
1563(a) (1988) (providing that corporations under "common control" generally
consist of those corporations affiliated through overlapping 80% ownership).
24. See Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 9312(b)(2)(A), 101
Stat. 1330-333, 1330-361 (1987) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1362(b)(2)(A) (1988)).
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). One issue regarding plan
termination that has arisen in bankruptcy is whether ERISA provides the ex-
clusive means by which a plan may be terminated once the sponsor has filed
for bankruptcy. At least one court, in In re Bastian Co., 45 B.R. 717 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1985), held that the debtor may reject pension plans as executory
[Vol. 77:803
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B. WHY THE PBGC is N Tm HOLE
The PBGC is currently in financial trouble. Although the
magnitude of the PBGC's crisis does not approach that of the
savings and loan debacle, the PBGC's deficit is nevertheless in
the billions of dollars. Recent estimates have put the PBGC's
negative net worth in the range of $2.5 billion, with predictions
that absent remedial legislation it will reach $18 billion before
the turn of the century °30
At least three factors contribute to the PBGC's existing fi-
nancial problems. The first is the PBGC's own "shoddy en-
forcement" practices in its role as pension funding regulator.31
contracts under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988), even in cases
where the beneficiaries have provided post-petition services to the debtor.
The viability of this holding, however, can be questioned for at least two
reasons. First, Bastian was decided prior to the enactment of § 1113 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, title I, § 541(a), 98
Stat. 390, 390 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988)). This is significant because
the pension plan at issue was part of a collective bargaining contract and
§ 1113 governs the rejection of collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy.
See Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Abso-
lute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1033 (1987).
Second, an amendment to ERISA after the case was decided states that ER-
ISA provides the "exclusive means" for termination of covered employee ben-
efit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1988). The legislative history of this
amendment indicates that Congress wished not to change existing law on
whether an employer could reject a pension plan as an executory contract.
See Mark Daniels, Pensions in Peri" Single Employer Pension Plan Termina-
tions in the Context of Corporate Bankruptcies, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 25, 46
(1991). The termination rules of ERISA do, of course, provide for circum-
stances for plan termination in bankruptcy, indicating at a minimum that Con-
gress "envisioned ERISA-regulated terminations of pension plans in
bankruptcy." Id. Simply because Congress envisioned ERISA-regulated ter-
minations in bankruptcy, however, does not necessarily mean that Congress
thereby intended to preclude employers from using § 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code to reject pension plans as executory contracts. See id. at 47.
30. Lockhart, supra note 3, at 195-96. James B. Lockhart, executive direc-
tor of the PBGC, estimates that the PBGC's exposure "could be as high as $20
billion to $30 billion in the event of a major recession that involved a down-
turn in the steel, automobile, and airline industries." Tighter Pension Insur-
ance Rules Urged to Protect Benefits in Reorganizations, 2 Bankr. L. Rep.
(BNA) 328, 330 (Apr. 5, 1990). ERISA provides that the federal government is
not liable for any of the PBGC's obligations. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(g)(2) (1988).
The PBGC may, however, borrow up to $100 million from the U.S. Treasury.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1305(c) (1988). Moreover, some of the PBGC's transactions are
reflected in the federal budget. See § 1302(g)(2); see also CONGRESSIONAL
BuDGET OFFICE, supra note 4, at 18 n.3 (discussing the financial relationship
between the PBGC and the federal government).
31. See Ellin Rosenthal, PBGC's Lockhart We're No FSLIC, 46 TAX
NOTES 502, 502 (1990) (discussing the charge that the PBGC has been guilty of
"shoddy enforcement" of its own rules).
19931
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Such practices have taken the form of poor monitoring, failure
to perfect potential liens, too-liberal granting of minimum
funding waivers, and tardiness in terminating underfunded
plans. It is probably fair to say that in recent years, as its defi-
cit problems have become more prominent, the PBGC has been
much more aggressive in its monitoring role.
A second reason for the PBGC's current financial plight is
a statutory scheme that gives too much discretion to employers
to determine precisely what their minimum funding obligations
will be in a given year. To determine whether employers are
complying with minimum funding standards, a number of actu-
arial assumptions are necessary. Among the actuarial assump-
tions that affect the minimum funding figure are mortality,
interest earned on plan assets, employee turnover, and salary
projections.3 2 Although these assumptions must be "reason-
able,"33 there is nevertheless a significant range within which
employers can accommodate their own funding preferences.
A dramatic illustration of the significance of actuarial as-
sumptions occurred when the pension plan of Allis-Chalmers's
United Auto Workers terminated in July, 1985. That plan had
a funding ratio that was less than two percent of vested bene-
fits, yet the plan was never in violation of ERISA's minimum
funding rules. 4 Further indicating the broad discretion left
with plan sponsors, at least one study has indicated that firms
tend to change their interest-rate assumptions for their pension
plans in the year prior to termination as a way to avoid addi-
tional contributions.35
In addition to the flexibility of actuarial assumptions, firms
may secure a min nm funding waiver for a given year. The
IRS may grant such waivers if the plan sponsor can demon-
strate that it is unable to meet the minimum funding standards
because of a "temporary substantial business hardship.136 The
use of waivers has on occasion significantly increased the liabil-
ity of the PBGC. For example, when Rath Packing terminated
its pension plans in 1982, accumulated unpaid waivers totalled
$29.5 million, about half of the plans' total unfunded liability at
termination.37 Rath had received waivers for the then-maxi-
32. See Durfee, supra note 10, at 45.
33. 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(3)(A) (1988).
34. See IPPOLITO, supra note 4, at 39.
35. See i- at 120.
36. 26 U.S.C. § 412(d)(1) (1988).
37. See IPPOLITO, supra note 4, at 54.
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mum five consecutive years.38
The third and easily most significant reason for the
PBGC's current massive deficit has nothing to do with poor
monitoring or with employer discretion regarding the size of
annual nnmum funding requirements. Rather, this crucial
factor stems from the nature of the PBGC guarantee itself, as it
was originally crafted in ERISA. Briefly stated, the biggest sin-
gle cause of the PBGC's present financial crisis is the decision
of Congress at the PBGC's inception to guarantee what is
known as "past service liability. '3 9
To understand the concept of past service liability, imagine
a single hypothetical company that wishes to establish for its
employees a qualified defined benefit pension plan covered by
the PBGC insurance program. At the pension plan's creation,
the employer has about a thousand employees whose service at
that point ranges from one year to thirty years. To make the
pension plan benefits significant for the most senior employees,
the employer would like to credit those employees for past
service.
The problem with such past service credit is that the em-
ployer thereby creates a huge funding liability immediately on
the plan's creation. An employer forced to fund this liability at
the plan's inception has a tremendous disincentive to create
such a plan at all. Thus, ERISA allows the employer to treat
this past service liability as if it were a thirty-year mortgage.
40
The annual payments due on this "mortgage" comprise the past
service component of the pension plan.4 ' The portion of the
employer's minimum funding costs that relate to employee
services rendered for the current year comprises the plan's nor-
mal costs.42
38. Il
39. See 26 U.S.C. § 412(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988) (providing that when a new plan
is established, past service of employees may be credited and the liability am-
ortized over 30 years); see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 4,
at xv (noting proposals to reconsider whether the PBGC should insure pen-
sions that have not been fully funded at least at some time in the past).
40. See 26 U.S.C. § 412(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
41. See Derry D. Sparlin, Jr., Minimum Funding Claims and Waivers, in
ABA FouRTH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN BANK-
RUPTCY AND LENDING TRANSACTIONS 1, 2 (1991) (explaining the term "un-
funded past service cost").
42. See id.; see also Priscilla E. Ryan, ERISA Considerations for Commer-
cial Lenders, in 13 ALI-ABA RESOuRCE MATERIALS: BANKING AND COMMER-
CIAL LENDING LAw 373, 376 (Richard T. Nassberg ed., 1992) (explaining
ERISA funding requirements). The funding requirements for a plan in a
given year may change based on plan experience affecting the assumptions
1993]
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The crucial point for purposes of the PBGC's solvency is
not simply that employers are given the right to pay past ser-
vice costs over time, but rather that the PBGC insurance covers
the employees' past service. The coverage for past service ben-
efits is probably the main source of the PBGC's projected
deficit.43
In light of this distinction between past service liability and
normal cost, it is important to understand the difference be-
tween two types of pension plan underfunding: underfunding
on a termination basis and underfunding on an ongoing basis.
A firm may properly fund a plan on an ongoing basis but still
severely underfund it on a termination basis.44 TWA, for exam-
ple, properly funded its pension plan on an ongoing basis, but
nevertheless underfunded the plan on a termination basis by
$900 million.45
For a plan to be properly funded on an ongoing basis
means simply that the sponsor has made all statutorily required
contributions and thus is on schedule to meet its ultimate obli-
gations.46 By contrast, for a plan to be properly funded on a
termination basis, the sponsor must have fully paid for all of
the past service liability that was amortized when the plan was
originally established.47 Because companies get thirty years
from the time of plan establishment to amortize these past ser-
vice costs, it will be rare for past service liability to be fully
funded at the time of plan termination.
When examining the financial plight of the PBGC, a com-
pany's underfunding on a termination basis is probably more
relevant than its underfunding on an ongoing basis. Clearly, it
is necessary for the PBGC's continued solvency that plan spon-
sors make the statutorily required annual funding contribu-
tions. But such payments will almost never be sufficient, at
least if the plan ends up terminating in the short term.
Thus, to determine the PBGC's potential exposure at any
supporting past contribution levels. An example of this sort of plan experi-
ence would be how actual patterns of retirement have matched predicted pat-
terns of retirement. Further, upward adjustments in the amount of required
contributions for a given year may be based on plan amendments that include
benefit increases for participants. See Sparlin, supra note 41, at 2.
43. Cf. CONGRESSIONAL BuDGET OFICE, supra note 4, at xv (asserting that
the government's own rules, rather than noncompliance by plan sponsors, are
often the source of a plan's underfunding).
44. 1&i at 15.
45. See Lockhart, supra note 3, at 197.
46. Keating, supra note 3, at 74 n.51.
47. See Lockhart, supra note 3, at 197.
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given point requires a dual inquiry: first, valuing the aggregate
underfunding of covered pension plans on a termination basis;
and second, an estimate of plans currently at risk for termina-
tion. If a plan does not terminate and annual minimum fund-
ing contributions are made, the PBGC will have no exposure
even though the plan is underfunded on a termination basis. In
fact, most plans probably fit this description: currently un-
derfunded on a termination basis, but nevertheless not a pres-
ent threat to the PBGC's fisc.
Unfortunately for the PBGC, the minority of plans that are
at risk for termination or do in fact terminate tend to have
some of the largest underfunding on a termination basis. Of
the fifty firms with the largest underfunded pension plans,
forty percent of the companies and seventy-five percent of the
underfunded amount are concentrated in the troubled steel, au-
tomobile and airline industries. 48 Furthermore, the PBGC esti-
mates that over fifty percent of its top fifty underfunded plans
are either probable or possible losses. 49
II. PBGC-RELATED CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
The issues of identifying and quantifying its claims in
bankruptcy are matters of more than just passing fancy to the
PBGC. First, a large number of PBGC-insured pension plan
terminations occur during the bankruptcy of the plan spon-
sor.50 Second, the valuation issue will often pit non-bankruptcy
ERISA policies against the equality of distribution norm of
bankruptcy in a battle that greatly affects the ultimate size of
the PBGC claim.51 In a number of large bankruptcies today,
the PBGC's various claims make it the single largest creditor in
the case, and its total exposure in some bankruptcies extends
into the hundreds of millions of dollars.52
48. Elin Rosenthal, PBGC Releases 'Top 50' List, 50 TAx NOTES 922, 923
(1991).
49. Id
50. See Daniels, supra note 29, at 80; see also Robin E. Phelan & J. Mitch-
ell Miller, Will ERISA Erase Ya?, in BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS FOR
WORKOUT OFFICERS AND LENDERS COUNSEL 371, 408 (PLI Commercial Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 507, 1989) (discussing plan sponsor and
control group liability to the PBGC).
51. See Daniels, supra note 29, at 31-32.
52. See, e.g., id. at 81-82.
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A. MINIMUM FUNDING AND PLAN ASSET INSUFFICIENCY
CLAIMS
Ultimately, the PBGC has just two major claims against
bankrupt sponsors of pension plans, and even these two claims
overlap to some extent. The PBGC's most significant claim in
bankruptcy will invariably be its so-called "plan asset insuffi-
ciency" claim. This claim arises on the termination of a cov-
ered pension plan, and it amounts to the difference between
the value of the plan assets at the time of termination and the
value of the plan's vested obligations to its participants.53 This
claim will typically be quite large because it will consist not
simply of required contributions that the plan sponsor failed to
make in the past, but also of all past service liability that ER-
ISA allowed the plan sponsor to amortize at the plan's incep-
tion. Put another way, all of the past service liability payments
that were to be due from the plan's sponsor in the future are
automatically accelerated on plan termination.M
The PBGC's second major claim in bankruptcy is for un-
paid funding contributions. This claim is typically just a subset
of the first claim. On termination of an ERISA-qualified pen-
sion plan, the PBGC is usually appointed statutory trustee of
the terminated plan.- As trustee, the PBGC may assert a
claim for any accrued but unpaid minimum funding contribu-
tions.56 This second claim, therefore, relates to the sponsor's
failure to fund the plan on an ongoing basis, whereas the first
claim represents underfunding on a termination basis.
Note that the amount of the plan asset insufficiency claim
should include the amount of missed funding contributions. If
a plan sponsor has been delinquent in its required annual fund-
ing contributions, the amount of the plan asset insufficiency
claim will already reflect that delinquency. A failure to fund
on an ongoing basis causes a corresponding reduction in the
amount of plan assets available at the time of termination,
making the plan asset insufficiency claim that much greater.
Although the PBGC will file claims for both amounts, courts
have held that to the extent the PBGC's claims for unpaid
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (1988).
54. See id
55. See Michael A. Lawson, Employee Benefits and Reorganization Under
Chapter 11: Is Shareholder Value Being Eroded? (PBGC Claims, Retiree Bene-
fits), in 18TH ANNuAL EMPLOYEE BENEFrrs INSTITUTE 165, 170 (PLI Tax Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 280, 1988).
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(c) (1988).
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funding contributions are allowed, its claims for plan asset in-
sufficiency must be appropriately reduced as duplicative.57
B. LIABn OF CONTROLLED GROUP MEMBERS
The PBGC's two major claims--for unpaid minimum fund-
ing contributions and plan asset insufficiency-are not merely
the responsibility of the plan's sponsor. Rather, the plan spon-
sor and the plan sponsor's "controlled group" are jointly and
severally liable for these claims.- The term "controlled group"
in this context generally includes all entities with at least an
eighty-percent ownership interest in the employer and all enti-
ties in which the employer owns at least an eighty-percent in-
terest.59 In some cases, such as Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. v. LTV,60 the existence of these additional debtors is not
especially helpful to the PBGC, because the entire controlled
group is in bankruptcy.
There may also be situations in which the liability of other
controlled group members who are not in bankruptcy will give
the PBGC leverage with respect to its position in the plan spon-
sor's bankruptcy. The Eastern Airlines bankruptcy is a case in
point. In that situation, Eastern's controlled group consisted of
its parent, Continental Airlines Holdings, Inc. and other affili-
ates, some of which were solvent at the time Eastern filed.6'
Due in large part to the PBGC's rights against non-bankrupt
controlled group members, the PBGC effected a bankruptcy
court-approved settlement with Eastern that proved quite at-
tractive to the federal corporation. 62
The Eastern settlement provided for the termination of its
pension plans and the establishment of a trust to be funded by
the assets of Eastern's terminated plans. 63 In addition, the
trust was to be funded by $30 million from Eastern and pay-
ment by the Continental controlled group for underfunding lia-
bility over a period not to exceed twelve years.6 Two months
57. See, e.g., LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 130 B.R. 690, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
58. See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b), (c) (1988).
59. Ryan, supra note 42, at 377.
60. 875 F.2d 1008, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 496 U.S.
633 (1990).
61. See Karen E. Wagner, Employee Benefit Claims in Bankruptcy, in
ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LITIGATION 381, 415-16
(1991).
62. See id.
63. Id. at 416.
64. Id.
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following bankruptcy court approval of the Eastern settlement,
however, Continental filed its own Chapter 11 bankruptcy, put-
ting in doubt the settlement agreement.65
C. LESS COMMON PBGC CLAiMs
There are two other, less common types of claims that the
PBGC may be able to assert in bankruptcy, depending on the
facts of the case. First, the PBGC, either in its own right or in
its capacity as trustee of a terminated plan, may be able to ex-
ercise common law contract rights.66 Such contract claims
could give the PBGC rights that go beyond its major statutory
claims. For example, the plan might include promissory notes
on which the plan sponsor is maker. Or a predecessor company
may have sold a division of the firm with a specific promise to
continue funding the pension plan of the unit that was sold.
The second of these less typical sorts of claims is a claim
for predecessor liability. Not uncommonly, a financially trou-
bled company will sell a subsidiary or division and transfer that
subsidiary's pension liabilities to its new owner. In the Single-
Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act (SEPPAA),67 Con-
gress provided that if a principal goal of a transaction is to
evade pension liability, then any person involved in that trans-
action who also shares that purpose can be held liable as if that
person were the contributing employer.68 Thus, the PBGC
might be able to assert a claim in the bankruptcy of a company
that sold a division in an attempt to rid itself of liability for the
sold unit's pension plan. This evasion liability applies as well to
any members of the evading person's controlled group.69 For
an evasion of liability claim to arise, an underfunded plan must
terminate within five years of the evasive transaction.70
SEPPAA by its terms applies evasion liability exclusively
to transactions occurring after January 1, 1986.71 At least one
court has recognized, however, a common-law evasion liability
65. Id.
66. See generally Carol C. Flowe & William Beyer, PBGC Bankruptcy
Claims, in ABA FOURTH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYEE BENE-
mS IN BANxRiurcy AND LENDING TRANSACTIONS, supra note 41, at 11
(describing various circumstances in which the PBGC would have contract
rights giving rise to additional bankruptcy claims).
67. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 237 (1986) (codified in scattered sections
of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (1988).
69. Id
70. Id.
71. See § 11,013(b), 100 Stat. at 261.
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similar to that in SEPPAA for transactions prior to 1986. In In
re International Harvester's Disposition of Wisconsin Steel,72
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that
an employer that sold a business prior to 1986 and delegated its
pension obligations as part of that transaction may nevertheless
be liable for the plan's underfunding. The court found that a
pension plan's former contributing sponsor remains liable if
two conditions exist: first, if a principal purpose of the sale is
to evade pension liability, and second, if the division's buyer
lacks an objectively reasonable chance of meeting those pension
obligations at the time of sale.73
Of course, the mere fact that predecessor liability now ex-
ists does not mean that courts will readily apply it. In In re
Doskocil Cos.,74 for example, the bankruptcy court refused to
allow the PBGC's claim for predecessor liability. The debtor's
predecessor sold the assets of two meat processing operations
that eventually went bankrupt.75 Each of the two operations
had pension plans that ultimately terminated with significant
underfunding.76 The sales of the two meat processing opera-
tions took effect prior to SEPPAA's enactment. 77
The PBGC claimed evasion liability against the debtor
based on two theories. First, the PBGC asserted a common-law
theory of evasion, pointing to the International Harvester
case.78 Second, the PBGC contended that certain continued
dealings between the debtor and the purchasers occurring after
1986 could constitute the necessary "transactions to evade" that
are required for SEPPAA evasion liability.79
Rejecting the PBGC's first argument, the court questioned
the viability of the International Harvester doctrine of com-
mon-law evasion liability as applied to pre-1986 sales.8 0 It de-
termined that the legislative history of the SEPPAA suggested
that it was unlikely that Congress intended the statute to im-
pose evasion liability prior to its effective date.8 1 Furthermore,
the court found, even if Harvester were correct, the PBGC in
72. 681 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
73. I& at 525-26.
74. 130 B.R. 858 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991).
75. See idi at 860.
76. The plans were underfunded by $38 million and $25 million, respec-
tively. IMi at 861.
77. See id at 860.
78. Id, at 864-65.
79. IMi at 868.
80. See id at 866.
81. Id-
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this case failed to produce facts showing either a subjective in-
tent on the debtor's part to evade pension liability or an objec-
tive inability of the buyer to meet its pension obligations.8 2
Regarding the PBGC's claim for SEPPAA evasion liability,
the court held that the statute only applies to certain types of
post-1985 transactions. Specifically, the court held that the
"transactions to evade liability" the SEPPAA contemplates
must amount to actual transfers of responsibility for meeting
the funding requirements of ERISA.83 Such transfers in this
case occurred prior to 1986.84 Furthermore, the court noted, to
adopt the broad definition of transaction the PBGC sought
would render the five-year limitation on evasion liability con-
tained in SEPPAA virtually meaningless.85 The court ex-
plained that many business sales of the type at issue in this case
involve extensions or renewals of credit from the seller to the
buyer, just as occurred here.86
D. VALUATION AND INTEREST RATE ASSUMPTIONS
A most difficult issue for courts when the PBGC is in-
volved in a bankruptcy is determining the precise amount of
the PBGC's claim. Valuing the PBGC's claim is most problem-
atic when the PBGC seeks recovery for plan asset insufficiency.
That amount, as discussed above, is the difference between the
value of the assets in the terminated plan and the total present
value of vested plan benefits at the termination date.87
Determining the value of the assets in the terminated plan
is typically not a problem. The amount in the plan account at
the time of termination is readily determinable. Quantifying
the present value of vested plan benefits, however, is a differ-
ent matter. As one court facing this issue candidly observed,
"'T]he truth is that the amount of the ultimate pension liabil-
ity is unknown and unknowable. How can you know how long
your employees will live, or whether they will quit before re-
tirement time, or how much medical costs will go up over the
next 50 years?' ,8
The truth is, you cannot. But a bankruptcy court still must
82. Id. at 867-68.
83. IML at 868.
84. IM
85. Id at 868-69.
86. Id. at 869.
87. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
88. LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),
126 B.R. 165, 167 n.4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Richard C. Breeden,
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try. Regarding questions such as employee life span, early re-
tirement patterns, and future medical costs, courts must rely on
actuarial assumptions. On this score, the PBGC clearly has ex-
pertise, and courts have shown a willingness to defer somewhat
to the PBGC experience in this realm.
8 9
Plugging in assumptions for all of these unknowable ques-
tions is, however, only half the battle. The issue of determining
a discount rate remains. A discount rate is necessary in bank-
ruptcy in any case in which a party's claim is to a future pay-
ment or stream of payments. Suppose, for example, that a
debtor purchased a machine from a seller on unsecured credit
and promised to pay the seller $2000 in cash two years from the
date of sale. If the debtor filed bankruptcy the very next day,
the seller clearly has a claim in bankruptcy. That claim, how-
ever, would not be for $2000. Rather, the amount of the seller's
claim in bankruptcy would be the present value of a $2000
promise that came due two years in the future.9°
How should the exact amount of the seller's claim be de-
termined? Certainly the claim will be for less than $2000, be-
cause receiving $2000 today is clearly worth more than even a
100% reliable promise to receive $2000 in two years' time. To
calculate how much less that $2000 payable in two years is
worth today, a discount rate is necessary. The discount rate is a
surrogate for the time value of money. It represents the return
that could be received on money between now and the time a
debtor's payment is due.91
The actuarial assumptions that were mentioned above in
the PBGC context do not speak to the issue of discount rate.
Rather, those assumptions simply enable a court to calculate
the amount and length of the stream of payments that repre-
sents the promise of the terminated pension plan. Once that
Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission, quoted in Dana W. Linden, If
Life Is Volatile, Account for It, FORBES, Nov. 12, 1990, at 120, 121).
89. See, e.g., LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 115 B.R. 760, 769-70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that the PBGC's ex-
pertise is valuable where issues such as actuarial considerations in determining
the face amount of aggregate future liabilities of a terminated plan arise).
90. The Bankruptcy Code makes it clear that claims are to be valued as of
the date of the bankruptcy filing. Section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides that the bankruptcy court shall determine the amount of each claim "as
of the date of the filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1988).
91. See generally ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN
BusINEss 29-44 (1989) (explaining the concept of the present value of a stream
of future payments).
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stream of payments is quantified, a court still must discount it
to its present value to determine the PBGC's claim.
In a large case, the choice of a discount rate for the PBGC's
claims has major implications. In the LTV case, for example,
each single percentage point difference in the chosen discount
rate would affect the PBGC's claim by $250 million.92 The
lower the discount rate, the higher would be the present value
of any claim for a future payment from the debtor. To no one's
surprise, the PBGC argued for a low discount rate in the LTV
case, whereas the debtor argued for a higher rate.93
The PBGC's chief argument for the lower rate was that
ERISA charges the PBGC with determining the present value
of all future plan benefits when a plan is terminated. 94 The
court in LTV, however, concluded that when it comes to the
valuation of claims in bankruptcy, it must subordinate ERISA
policies to bankruptcy policies.95 Such bankruptcy policies, ac-
cording to the court, require interest rate assumptions that are
likely to yield the claim's full economic value.9 Further, the
court observed that a party asserting a claim against the estate
should not have such broad discretion to affect the return on its
claim.97
The guiding principle for choosing a discount rate in this
context, the LTV court held, is the rate of return available to a
reasonable, prudent private pension fund investor.98 Such a hy-
pothetical investor is assumed to invest in a prudent portfolio
with the guiding objective of earning the highest return on the
invested capital consistent with the preservation of the capital
and minimization of risk.99 Applying this model in the LTV
92. See Chateaugay, 115 B.R. at 771.
93. See LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 126 B.R. 165, 171 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
94. See id at 172.
95. See id at 170, 172.
96. See id& at 176. This second Chateaugay bankruptcy court opinion deal-
ing with valuation was issued pursuant to a referral by the district court to the
bankruptcy court for findings of fact and conclusions of law on the valuation
issue. The district court made this referral pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)
(1988) after it had agreed to the PBGC's request for a withdrawal of reference
of this matter from the bankruptcy court. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
Official Parent Creditors' Comm. of LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 108
B.R. 27, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
97. See Chateaugay, 126 B.R. at 172 (explaining that "it is the Bankruptcy
Court, not the claiming creditor, which makes the determination as to the ap-
propriate discount rate").
98. I& at 177.
99. See i&L
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case, the court chose a discount rate of 11.5%, four percentage
points higher than the risk-free rate the PBGC proposed.' °°
E. ALLOWABILITY OF DmEcT CLAIMS BY PLAN PARTICIPANTS
When an employer sets up a defined benefit pension plan,
its obligation in most instances is simply to fund the pension
plan rather than to pay the benefits owed under the plan.101
An employer nevertheless may, either in the pension plan or
outside of the plan, guarantee the payment of pension benefits
if the plan assets on termination are insufficient to cover such
benefits. 0 2 In cases involving such a separate promise, courts
have historically upheld the right of plan beneficiaries to re-
cover from their plan sponsor the difference between the bene-
fits promised in the plan and those the PBGC guaranteed. 0 3
The cases that have upheld such a contract right on the
part of plan beneficiaries were decided, however, prior to the
100. See id, at 172. The second Chateaugay bankruptcy court was actually
faced with choosing among five different discount rates: a PBGC-calculated
rate that used the agency's interpretation of statutory law and regulations; a
second PBGC-suggested rate based on the rate a private insurer would charge
the terminating company for guaranteed annuity contracts that covered the
company's vested pension liabilities; a third PBGC rate which purported to be
a pure present-value approach that used a risk-free discount rate; a rate pro-
posed by LTV that was risk-adjusted and employed a company-specific risk of
default (thus increasing the rate significantly from a risk-free rate); and the
rate that the committee of unsecured creditors of LTV Steel proposed and the
court ultimately chose, a pension fund portfolio theory that used a risk-ad-
justed discount rate. See id.
101. See Cummings, supra note 1, at 1808.
102. See David G. Heiman, Executory Contracts, Employee Relations and
Pension Claims, Interim Distributions and Acquisitions of Interests in Clp-
ter 11 Cases, in CHAPTER 11 Bus-ESS REORGANIzATIoNs 247, 414 (PLI Com-
mercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 598, 1992).
103. See, e.g., Murphy v. Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233, 234 (3d Cir. 1980)
(upholding the right of employees under a collectively bargained pension plan
to recover from the employer the difference between benefits the plan prom-
ised and those that the PBGC guaranteed), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982);
see also In re M & M Transp. Co., 3 B.R. 722, 724-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding
that an employer may be liable to former employees for benefits due under a
terminated plan even though the employer met its obligations to the PBGC
under ERISA). But see In re Johnson Steel & Wire Co., 61 B.R. 203, 206-07
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (refusing to allow claim of employees for the difference
between what was originally promised under a pension plan and the amount
that the PBGC actually paid on termination because the company had care-
fully limited its direct liability to employees in case of plan termination and
because employees' failure to familiarize themselves with pension plan and
trust documents did not render the plan provisions non-binding).
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enactment of the Pension Protection Act (PPA) in 1987.104 The
PPA contains a key amendment to ERISA that gives the PBGC
a claim against the contributing sponsor for 100% of all vested
benefits at the time of termination.1 5 By contrast, when these
earlier cases were decided, the PBGC's claim against the termi-
nating employer was merely for a percentage of the benefits
the PBGC guaranteed. 0 6 Furthermore, ERISA now provides
that the PBGC must distribute to plan beneficiaries any
amounts that it recovers from the terminating sponsor that are
in excess of the guaranteed benefits that the PBGC must ulti-
mately pay.10 7
In light of these significant changes in the statutory recov-
ery scheme, it is not surprising that the bankruptcy court in In
re Adams Hard Facing Co.,' 08 a 1991 case, reached a result dif-
ferent from the earlier cases treating this issue. In Adams
Hard Facing, the court refused to allow the direct claims of
plan participants against the debtor for pension plan entitle-
ments not guaranteed by the PBGC.10 9 In reaching its decision,
the court cited specifically the PPA amendment creating the
PBGC's increased recovery claim against terminating employ-
ers.110  The court also held that allowing these direct partici-
pant claims would defeat the purpose of the ERISA section that
allocates non-guaranteed benefit amounts among plan partici-
pants according to the priorities set out in ERISA."'
F. CONTRIBUTIONS DURING BANKRUPTCY TO ONGOING PLANS
Not every pension plan terminates when a company files
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In those cases where the debtor's pen-
sion plan continues, courts must decide whether the debtor
may continue to make its regular annual funding contributions
104. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-333 (1987) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
105. See ic- § 9312(b)(2)(A), 101 Stat. at 1330-361 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 1362(b)(1)(A) (1988)).
106. See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (1982), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (1988).
107. See Wagner, supra note 61, at 412-13. Section 9312(a) of the Pension
Protection Act repealed the former ERISA § 4049 trust and § 9312(b)(3) added
29 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1) (1988), which provides that if on collection of its claim
for the full amount of unfunded benefits the PBGC collects more than its own
reimbursement claim, the PBGC must distribute the excess to the benefi-
ciaries of the terminated plan. See § 9312(a), (b)(3), 101 Stat. at 1330-361.
108. 129 B.R. 662 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
109. See i. at 663.
110. See id.
111. Id-
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to the plan. Although this question is not wholly settled, the
argument seems stronger that courts should allow continued
funding contributions by the debtor.
Such payments are probably proper for a number of rea-
sons. First, plan participants can contend that contributions to
pension plans are analogous to post-petition wages and thus
should be paid currently as a cost of administration.1 2 Second,
SEPPAA establishes new standards for termination that sug-
gest that Congress intended that payments to ongoing plans
continue in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. These new standards
forbid a company in Chapter 11 from voluntarily terminating a
pension plan unless the bankruptcy court decides that the com-
pany could not survive outside of bankruptcy absent a termina-
tion of the plan. 11  Congress apparently intended that pension
plans continue in effect during and "ride through" the bank-
ruptcy reorganization whenever possible.
The argument against continued funding of an ongoing
pension plan in Chapter 11 is that such contributions in fact
represent payment for previously performed work.114 As such,
the contributions constitute impermissible payments to pre-pe-
tition creditors. 1 5 Unfortunately, assessing the validity of this
assertion is complicated by the typical allocation of any plan
year's funding contributions between normal cost and past ser-
vice cost.
As noted earlier, normal cost represents the present value
112. See Columbia Packing Co. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 81 B.R. 205,
208 (D. Mass. 1988); see also In re Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 713 F.2d 476, 480
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that pre-petition settlement by debtor with maritime
association's pension plan was properly permitted in full as an administrative
expense). Section 363(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code arguably gives a statutory
justification for such payments by allowing the debtor in Chapter 11 to use
property of the estate "in the ordinary course of business" without notice or a
hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Further, § 363(b)(1) al-
lows the Chapter 11 debtor to use property outside of the ordinary course of
business following notice and a hearing.
113. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B) (1988).
114. Cf. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 875 F.2d 1008, 1019 (2d
Cir. 1989) (noting that employees of LTV gave their pre-petition labor partly
in consideration for the company's pension promises, thus causing "any obliga-
tion to pay into the pension fund plans [to be] pre-petition debts"), rev'd on
other grounds, 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
115. Section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee to avoid any
transfer of property of the estate that occurs post-petition and is not otherwise
authorized by the Bankruptcy Code or by the court. See 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)
(1988 & Supp. lI 1991). Thus, contributions to pension plans that the debtor
made post-petition would be potentially avoidable under § 549 absent a proper
Bankruptcy Code justification or specific authorization by the court.
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of plan benefits that workers accrue for work performed during
that year.116 Past service cost, however, technically stems from
services plan participants rendered prior to the effective date of
the plan's establishment. 117 Thus, one could argue that the por-
tion of the sponsor's annual contribution attributable to the
plan's normal cost should be an allowable expense of the
debtor's administration, whereas the typically larger portion for
past service cost may not serve as the basis of a permissible
post-petition payment by the debtor.
The notion of bifurcating the expenses of a pension plan
between normal cost and past service cost is relevant in other
contexts as well. For example, in considering the priority of
the PBGC's claims in bankruptcy, some courts have chosen to
grant a special status only to the portion of a plan's unfunded
liability that represents normal cost.:1
The realities of the situation, however, make such a differ-
ential treatment of normal cost as compared with past service
cost seem artificial. Pension promises are, after all, nothing
more than a form of deferred compensation. The "quid pro
quo" between employee and employer in this regard is essen-
tially that the employee agrees to work in a given year and the
employer agrees in return to make the proper minimum fund-
ing contribution for that year. Simply because the amount of
any year's pension funding requirement includes a component
known as "past service cost" does not change the fact that the
entire payment is compensation for the work of employees in
that calendar year.
Although past service cost is calculated with reference to
the number of years of past service, such an expense is in no
sense compensation for those past years' labor. Remember that
during those previous years, the employer had no defined pen-
sion plan in place. The compensation for work done during
that earlier period was whatever salary and non-pension fringe
benefits the employer was offering at the time. In short, as one
court astutely observed, the past service cost component of a
pension plan's funding requirements should be considered
merely an actuarial unit of measure rather than true compensa-
116. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
117. See Sparlin, supra note 41, at 2.
118. See, e.g., LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 115 B.R. 760, 776-78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying administrative
priority status to PBGC claims except for a small portion attributable to post-
petition service of the debtor's employees).
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tion for work performed at an earlier time.- 9
III. PBGC LIENS AND NON-LIEN BANKRUPTCY
PRIORITIES
The reality of most corporate bankruptcies is that those at
the back of the creditor line are not likely to recover on their
claims. Thus, a creditor's ability to assert successfully some
special status for a claim becomes crucial. Such status may
take the form of a valid and unavoidable lien or it may involve
qualifying for one of the Bankruptcy Code's priority classes.
The priority or lien position that the PBGC seeks for its claims
in bankruptcy will often make the difference between signifi-
cant recoveries for the federal pension insurer or bare minimal
return. It is hardly surprising, then, that the PBGC has in-
vested much of its political effort in the last couple of years to
improving through legislation what it sees as its less-than-ade-
quate status as a claimant in bankruptcy cases. 2 0
A. TYPES OF LIENS
The PBGC has some chance of asserting three major types
of liens in the bankruptcy of a plan sponsor. Two of these
three liens correspond to the two major claims that the PBGC
will normally have against a terminating employer, those for
plan asset insufficiency and delinquent minimum funding con-
tributions. 12 ' The PBGC lien with the greatest potential signif-
icance is that which corresponds to the PBGC's claim for plan
asset insufficiency.
The plan asset insufficiency lien arises only after demand
by the PBGC.122 Further, this lien must be perfected in the
same manner as a tax lien in order for it to be effective against
later judgment or secured creditors as well as against the
119. See Columbia Packing Co. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 81 B.R. 205,
209 (D. Mass. 1988).
120. See Rosenthal, OMB Proposal, supra note 2, at 1081 (noting legislative
proposals for the PBGC that include improving its position in bankruptcy); see
also Chandler Introduces Administration-Supported Pension Protection Legis-
lation, 20 TAx MGMT. COMPENSATION PLAN. J. 48, 48 (1992) [hereinafter Pen-
sion Protection Legislation] (describing proposed legislation that would give
the "PBGC higher priority in bankruptcy proceedings, as well as a greater role
in managing these proceedings").
121. See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (plan asset insufficiency), (c) (delinquent fund-
ing contributions) (1988).
122. See 29 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (1988).
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trustee in bankruptcy. 2 3 The amount of the lien is the lesser
of either the PBGC's total plan asset insufficiency claim or
thirty percent of the aggregate net worth of the contributing
sponsor's controlled group.2 4
The second major type of lien that the PBGC might assert
in bankruptcy cases actually takes two forms. This lien stems
from the plan sponsor's failure to make required funding con-
tributions. The first form that this lien takes is identical to the
lien described above for plan asset insufficiency, and, indeed
finds its source in the same ERISA section.us This lien arises
only after demand by the PBGC, must ultimately be perfected
by the PBGC, and has the above-described thirty-percent net
worth limitation.126
The PPA created the second form of the delinquent fund-
ing contribution lien. This form, unlike the first, arises auto-
matically against a plan sponsor on the sixtieth day after a
missed contribution installment was due.m2? Its limitation is
that it applies only to the extent that missed contributions ex-
ceed $1 million in the aggregate.1 -s Although this second lien
form arises without the need for a formal demand, it must also
be perfected like a tax lien for it to be effective against certain
other parties-2 9
The third major type of PBGC lien relates to the IRS's
granting of a minimum funding waiver. Congress gave the IRS
the specific authority to require collateral from a plan sponsor
as a condition to granting a minimum funding waiver for a par-
ticular year. 30 The lien that arises as a result is not subject to
the usual tax perfection requirements and only the PBGC may
enforce it.' 3 '
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 1368(c)(4) (1988). The tax lien procedure is set forth at
26 U.S.C. § 6323(f) (1988). The trustee is given the power through Bankruptcy
Code § 544(a) to avoid any liens that are unperfected at the point of the bank-
ruptcy filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (1988); see also Flowe & Beyer, supra note 66, at 7
(explaining ERISA employer liability provisions).
125. See 29 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (1988).
126. See id.; see also Sparlin, supra note 41, at 13 (describing the effect of
§ 1368(a) on the PBGC's claims for plan asset insufficiency).
127. See 29 U.S.C. § 1082(f) (1988).
128. See id
129. See 29 U.S.C. § 1082(f)(4)(C) (1988).
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 1085a(a)(2) (1988).
131. See id There are two other less common sources of collateral from
which the PBGC might benefit. First, the IRS may levy an excise tax and,
eventually, create a lien against the assets of an underfunded plan's sponsor.
A 10% excise tax is imposed automatically if a funding deficiency has accumu-
[ ol. 77:803
PBGC AND BANKRUPTCY
B. WHY PBGC LIENS OFTEN FAIL TO WORK IN BANKRUPTCY
A number of Bankruptcy Code provisions hinder the effec-
tive use of the PBGC's liens in the bankruptcy of a plan spon-
sor. The first and most prominent of these Code provisions is
section 362, the automatic stay, which is discussed in Part IV
below. Essentially, the automatic stay prevents the PBGC from
taking the actions necessary to perfect its liens post-petition,
even where the liens arise or attach prior to bankruptcy. The
problem is particularly severe in practice because by the time
the PBGC recognizes the need for collateral, the terminating
company is typically already in bankruptcy. 132 Moreover, even
if the automatic stay did not prevent the lien's formation post-
petition, section 545 of the Bankruptcy Code would by itself
avoid the fixing of a statutory lien such as the PBGC's on prop-
erty of the debtor if the lien were unperfected at the point of
the bankruptcy filing.133
A further obstacle to the effective use of PBGC liens in
bankruptcy cases is found in Bankruptcy Code section 724. Sec-
tion 724 provides that in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, tax liens and
certain tax lien equivalents such as the PBGC's liens are denied
secured status in a bankruptcy liquidation even if they were
perfected pre-petition.1' Instead, the claims underlying these
perfected pre-petition liens must settle for seventh-priority sta-
tus as tax claims. 35
The Bankruptcy Code does include one provision found
within section 547s preference rules that actually aids the
lated. See 26 U.S.C. § 4971(a) (1988). An additional tax of 100% of the accu-
mulated funding deficiency is imposed if the shortfall is not eliminated after
notice from the IRS. See § 4971(a), (b), (d). The IRS can create a lien on the
employer's property if the employer fails to pay the excise tax after a demand
by the IRS. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6323, 6325 (1988). Second, the PPA created
a new rule in which the PBGC can demand security if a benefit increase will
bring the ratio of a plan's assets to current liabilities under 60%. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 401(a)(29) (1988). The plan loses its qualification if the security is not pro-
vided. See id.
132. See Edward R. Mackiewicz & Paul A. Green, Pension-Related Claims
in Bankruptcy, PENSION BRIEFINGS, July 1987, reprinted in PENSION AND WEL-
FARE BENEFITS IN BANKRUprCY, supra note 10, at 421, 435; see also McCulloch
et al., supra note 11, at 225 (discussing priorities and liens creditors assert
against firms in bankruptcy).
133. Bankruptcy Code § 545(2) provides that a trustee may avoid the fixing
of a statutory lien on the debtor's property if the lien "is not perfected or en-
forceable at the time of the commencement of the case" against a hypothetical
bona fide purchaser for value. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
134. See 11 U.S.C. § 724(b), (d) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
135. See 11 U.S.C. § 724(b)(2), (b)(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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PBGC's lien status. Normally, if perfected less than simultane-
ously with its attachment and within ninety days of a bank-
ruptcy filing, the lien is avoidable as a preference.136 Section
547(c)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code creates an exception to pref-
erence liability for any statutory liens not avoidable under sec-
tion 545137 If a statutory lien such as the PBGC's is perfected
pre-petition, even if only within ninety days of bankruptcy, it
nevertheless survives scrutiny under section 545 and thus quali-
fies for section 547(c)(6) protection.138
C. THE SECTIoN 507(a)(7) PRIORITY
The PBGC must perfect its two major liens, for plan asset
insufficiency and for missed funding requirements, in the same
manner as tax liens.139 The PBGC has seized on this language
in ERISA to argue that the claims underlying these liens are
entitled to priority status even in cases where it did not perfect
the liens themselves in time to be effective in bankruptcy. 140
Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code creates various catego-
ries of priority claims. Section 507(a)(7) gives a seventh prior-
ity to certain tax claims.141 The PBGC contended in the LTV
case that although it failed to perfect its lien, it should be
treated in bankruptcy at least no worse than a federal taxing
authority, and thus should benefit from the seventh-priority po-
sition that the IRS enjoys. 42 The district court disagreed with
this contention, however, and held that the PBGC'should be
treated like any other unsecured creditor.143
The court reasoned that just because the PBGC is entitled
to create a lien that is tantamount to a federal tax lien, the un-
derlying claim itself should not necessarily be given tax priority
136. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). If perfection takes
place within 10 days of attachment, however, the lien will not be avoidable as
a preference even if perfection took place within the 90 days before filing. See
§ 547(e)(2) (creating a 10-day grace period between attachment and perfection
for purposes of preference law).
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) (1988).
138. See id,
139. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082(f)(4)(C) (1988), 1368(c)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
140. See, e.g., LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 115 B.R. 760, 779-80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
141. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988).
142. See LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 130 B.R. 690, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
143. See idi; see also In re Divco Philadelphia Sales Corp., 64 B.R. 232, 234
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (finding that although "an ERISA lien for employer lia-
bility is to be treated as a tax lien for purposes of priority, § 1368 does not state
that the underlying ERISA liability is tax liability").
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status.' 44 The court noted also that the legislative history to
section 724 of the Bankruptcy Code specifically mentions ER-
ISA claims, but that the list of taxes in section 507(a)(7) fails to
do so.145 Thus, the court concluded, any potential tax-related
priority owned by the PBGC may occur only in a Chapter 7
case, pursuant to the terms of section 724.14
D. THE SECTION 503(b)(1)/SEcTIoN 507(a)(1) PRIORITY
Section 507(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code gives a first un-
secured priority to any administrative expenses allowed under
section 503(b).1 47 Section 503(b)(1)(a) includes within the list
of allowable administrative expenses "the actual, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages,
salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the com-
mencement of the case."'148
Seizing on this language, the PBGC has argued for an ad-
ministrative expense priority status for its claims.149 The
PBGC contends that both the debtor's unpaid funding obliga-
tions and its termination liability are actual and necessary costs
of preserving the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 50 In particular,
the PBGC has strenuously contended that as long as the termi-
nation of a pension plan takes place post-petition, then all of
the termination liability arising at that point must be consid-
ered a priority expense of administration.' 5 '
144. See Chateaugay, 130 B.R. at 697.
145. Id
146. See id In Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Washington Group, 8 Em-
ployee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1351, 1358 (M.D.N.C. 1987), the court held that the
PBGC's failure to perfect a lien pre-bankruptcy did not prevent its enforce-
ment post-bankruptcy. The court reasoned that ERISA's mandated priority
for that lien, if the PBGC's claim were to lack any priority, would defeat the
congressional purpose of protecting vested employee benefits. Id. In LTV
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 115 B.R. 760,
782 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), the bankruptcy court rejected the Washington
Group case as failing to distinguish a claim and a lien. The Chateaugay court
further criticized Washington Group by noting that although the claim arose
under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, the court failed to notice that the
debtor raised arguments under the Bankruptcy Code. Id.; Cf. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 470 F. Supp. 945, 953 n.19 (D. Mass. 1979) (dic-
tum) (suggesting in Bankruptcy Act case that an unperfected PBGC lien
would at least get tax priority under the Bankruptcy Code), qff'd, 630 F.2d 4
(1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 914 (1981).
147. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1988).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988).
149. See, e.g., Chateaugay, 115 B.R. at 765.
150. I& at 775.
151. Id. at 772-73.
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The PBGC put forth this argument in LTV, but went little
further than its similar contention for section 507(a)(7) status.
On appeal, the district court agreed with the bankruptcy court's
denial of the PBGC's claim for section 507(a)(1) status.152 The
bankruptcy court analyzed the PBGC claim for administrative
expense status in light of a two-part test for allowance under
the rubric of section 503(b)(1). First, the obligation in question
must arise from a transaction with the post-petition, rather
than the pre-petition, debtor, and second, the obligation for
which administrative expense status is sought must have di-
rectly benefited the estate.153
Applying this test, the bankruptcy court determined that
the obligation of LTV to the PBGC on plan termination was re-
ally of a pre-petition rather than a post-petition nature. Even
though the technical "breach" in this case occurred post-peti-
tion on plan termination, the true triggering event for the
debtor's liability was the pre-petition labor of its employees in
exchange for the promise of future pensions.'5 As for benefit
to the estate, the bankruptcy court pointed out that the pension
plan termination in no way induced any employees to continue
working for the estate, since most of the pension obligations
were owed to retirees.155
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclu-
sion that only a small portion of the PBGC's claim should be
classified as an administrative expense. 56 That portion of the
claim would be for any unfunded contributions due during the
bankruptcy case itself that were directly attributable to the
post-petition labor of LTV employees. 157
Even as to these unfunded post-petition contributions, the
LTV court was more restrictive than some other courts have
been when faced with a similar issue. The court in LTV did not
allow an administrative expense priority even for the full
amount of unpaid contributions to the plan that could be allo-
cated to the period between bankruptcy filing and plan termi-
nation. Instead, the court allowed the priority for only that
portion of unpaid post-petition contributions representing the
152. See LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 130 B.R. 690, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
153. Chateaugay, 115 B.R. at 772.
154. Id. at 773-75.
155. Id. at 775-76.
156. See Chateaugay, 130 B.R. at 697.
157. Id.
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plan's normal cost rather than its past service cost.'-"
As suggested earlier, this part of the LTV opinion probably
goes too far in restricting the priority of the PBGC. 59
Although the annual funding requirements for a pension plan
can be divided into a normal cost and past service component,
the reality is that the promise of any year's annual contribution
represents consideration to employees for work that they will
perform during that year. On this score, the LTV holding is in
conflict with the district court holding in Columbia Packing Co.
v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.'60
In Columbia Packing, the court reasoned that the entire
unpaid funding requirements allocable to the period between
bankruptcy filing and plan termination ought to be given the
section 507(a)(1) priority.' 61 The court rejected the debtor's ar-
gument, accepted in LTV, that the. portion of the funding re-
quirement attributable to past service cost is pre-petition in
nature and therefore not eligible for the priority.162 The court
held that past service cost "is more properly viewed as simply
an actuarial unit of measure for determining the employer's
current periodic contribution."' 63 As such, it is not really com-
pensation for work performed before the inception of the plan
and thus need not be viewed as pre-petition in nature.' 64
E. THE SECTION 507(a)(4) PRIORITY
One other section of the Bankruptcy Code gives the PBGC
a source of potential priority for at least one of its bankruptcy
claims, its claim for unpaid minimum funding contributions.
That section, 507(a)(4), gives a fourth priority to unsecured
claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan that arise
from services rendered within 180 days before the date of the
bankruptcy filing or the cessation of the debtor's business,
whichever occurred first. 65
In addition to the time period within which the appropriate
services must have been provided, several other limitations at-
158. See id Although the district court did not explicitly distinguish nor-
mal cost and past service cost, the bankruptcy court opinion that the district
court affirmed did address the issue. See Chateaugay, 115 B.R. at 777.
159. See supra p. 824.
160. 81 B.R. 205 (D. Mass. 1988).
161. Id- at 207-09.
162. See id at 208-09.
163. Id at 209.
164. See id.
165. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)(A) (1988).
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tach to a section 507(a)(4) priority claim. Section 507(a)(4)(B)
states that the total priority claimed thereunder cannot exceed
$2000 per employee covered by the employee benefit plan.'66
Furthermore, any priority under section 507(a)(4) must be re-
duced by the aggregate amount paid to employees under the
section 507(a)(3) wage priority. 67 The section 507(a)(4) priority
must also be reduced by any amounts the estate paid on behalf
of employees to any other employee benefit plan. 1
68
Just as in the context of section 507(a)(1), the distinction
between the normal cost component of required pension contri-
butions and the past service cost component creates a point of
controversy among courts. Calculating the section 507(a)(4)
priority according to LTV's logic in the section 507(a)(1) con-
text includes only the normal cost component of pension plan
contributions.169 Other courts, however, such as that in Colum-
bia Packing, hold that the section 507(a)(4) priority may in-
clude both the normal cost and past service portions of any
unpaid minimum funding contributions.170
In Columbia Packing, the bankruptcy court also con-
fronted the issue of how to calculate the amount of the section
507(a)(4) priority in a case where the number of employees had
been fluctuating during the 180 days immediately prior to the
bankruptcy filing.171 The court offered a detailed formula that
the district court upheld on appeal with one slight modification.
According to the bankruptcy- court, three steps are in-
volved in arriving at the proper section 507(a)(4) figure in a
case involving an unstable work force. First, the company's
minimum annual required contribution must be multiplied by
180/365 to reflect the time limit within which the section
507(a)(4) priority may accrue. 72 Second, the resulting figure
must be multiplied by X/Y, where X is the average number of
employees working for the company during the final 180 days
166. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)(B) (1988).
167. Id
168. Id
169. See LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 115 B.R. 760, 777 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
170. See Columbia Packing Co. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 81 B.R. 205,
209-10 (D. Mass. 1988); see also In re United Dep't Stores, 49 B.R. 462, 465
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that "claims for contributions to employee
benefit plans keyed to discrete employee services are granted a fourth priority
under section 507(a)(4)").
171. See In re Columbia Packing Co., 47 B.R. 126, 131 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1985).
172. Id- at 131-32.
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and Y is the number of employees on which the actuarially de-
termined minimum annual contribution was calculated.173 This
second step adjusts for the fact that fewer employees than the
annual minimum funding figure had originally assumed per-
formed the necessary "services rendered" during the 180 days
before bankruptcy. Third, according to the bankruptcy court,
the result of this calculation must be no greater than $2000
times X, where X again is the average number of employees
working for the company during the 180 days before
bankruptcy.174
The district court in Columbia Packing made one modifica-
tion to the bankruptcy court's formula, to account for the effect
of the normal cost/past service cost dichotomy on the bank-
ruptcy court's second step. The district court held that when
decreasing the PBGC's priority to reflect a reduction in the av-
erage number of employees during the priority period, the re-
ducing fraction should be multiplied only by the normal cost
portion of the minimum funding contribution. 175 The past ser-
vice portion should not be similarly reduced, the court said, be-
cause that past service liability "is more accurately viewed as a
current cost of continuing the plan rather than as a form of
compensation for past service."'176 Put another way, the district
court rightly recognized that even when an employee quits, the
company will continue to owe the past service portion of that
employee's vested pension rights for many years. This will be
true even though any further normal costs attributed to that
employee can cease in the future.
F. PBGC SETOFF RIGHTS
Other than lien status or statutory priority status, a credi-
tor can make itself preferred in bankruptcy through one other
method: a right of setoff. A right of setoff exists when a
debtor and creditor are mutually indebted and the debts are
due and owing on each side. Section 553 of the Bankruptcy
Code preserves the creditor's right of setoff, provided that that
right exists at the point of the bankruptcy filing.17 7
173. Id
174. IM at 132.
175. Columbia Packing Co. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 81 B.R. 205, 210
(D. Mass. 1988).
176. Id-
177. See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). Section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code also
provides that the creditor's right to setoff is subject to the constraints of § 362's
automatic stay. See § 553(a). Section 362(a)(7) stays the setoff of any pre-peti-
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It is conceivable, though not likely, that the PBGC will owe
a debt to a plan sponsor at the time the sponsor files for bank-
ruptcy. More common would be an instance in which some
other branch of the federal government owed the debtor
money, while at the same time, the debtor owed liability to the
PBGC. This latter situation existed, for example, in the case of
In re Art Metal U.S.A. 178
In Art Metal, the debtor filed bankruptcy at a time when
the U.S. Postal Service and General Services Administration
owed it certain debts,179 and the debtor owed money to the
PBGC. °80 The PBGC hoped to benefit from this arrangement
to setoff funds that the two government agencies owed to the
debtor.181 The court in Art Metal, however, construed the ele-
ments of setoff strictly and refused the PBGC's request. The
court denied the PBGC's setoff rights because the PBGC lacked
the crucial element of mutuality of obligation with the
debtor. 8 2 The court explained that Congress "establish[ed] the
PBGC as a separate, self-sustaining entity whose profits do not
go to the U.S. government."'1 3 In addition, Congress provided
that the government would not be liable for the obligations of
the PBGC. 84 Therefore, the court concluded, "Congress effec-
tively denied the PBGC the right to setoff its claims against the
debts" of otherwise unrelated agencies of the U.S.
government. 85
IV. THE PGBC AND THE AUTOMATIC STAY
Clearly the automatic stay has been a major obstacle in
bankruptcy for the PBGC. Scarcely any of the PBGC's most
significant enforcement powers-termination, restoration, and
lien creation-are completely safe from the stay's broad reach.
Fortunately for the PBGC, there is an important exception to
the stay for certain regulatory actions by government agencies.
This exception at least provides the PBGC an opportunity in
tion debt owed to the debtor, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (1988), but a creditor
should ultimately be able to effect such a setoff by obtaining a lift of the stay
for cause under § 362(d)(1).
178. 109 B.R. 74 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989).
179. I& at 75.
180. I& at 76-77.
181. See id at 75.
182. Id. at 80.
183. Ia
184. Id-
185. Id
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some situations to continue pursuing its enforcement goals de-
spite the intervention of bankruptcy.
A. RESTORATION ACTIONS
The question of restoration has arisen so far only in the
LTV case, but the various opinions extensively discuss whether
the automatic stay prohibits the PBGC's restoration of a pen-
sion plan during bankruptcy. 86 Although these opinions have
covered the issue in some depth, virtually all of the judicial pro-
nouncements thus far have technically been dicta. The opin-
ions concluded that the PBGC's restoration of LTV's pension
plans was improper for reasons other than the stay. Thus, the
statements in these cases concerning the effect of the stay on
restoration are in fact superfluous. Nevertheless, litigants and
courts alike tend to attach weight even to those legal pro-
nouncements that are not necessary to reach the result in a
given case. That is especially true in LTV, since the district
court and court of appeals in that case have had tremendous ex-
perience in deciding many of the country's most significant
commercial and bankruptcy issues.
LTV contended that the PBGC's restoration action violated
three provisions of bankruptcy's automatic stay. First, accord-
ing to LTV, the restoration initiated an administrative proceed-
ing that could have been commenced pre-petition and thus
violated section 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 8 7 Second,
the restoration involved exercise of control over property of the
estate and thereby ran afoul of section 362(a)(3).18 1 Finally,
LTV argued that restoring the plans constituted an impermissi-
ble attempt to collect a pre-petition debt not allowable under
section 362(a)(6).18 9
Besides violating the letter of the stay, LTV said that the
PBGC's restoration was contrary to the policy behind the stay.
LTV claimed that through restoration the PBGC hoped to
186. The PBGC's ability to restore a pension plan is essentially the antithe-
sis of its power to terminate a plan. On restoration, the original plan sponsor
resumes responsibility for funding the plan. The Supreme Court's 1990 deci-
sion in Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990), recog-
nized the PBGC's broad discretion in restoring terminated pension plans of
companies in Chapter 11. For a complete analysis of that case and its impact,
see Keating, supra note 3, at 79-86.
187. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),
87 B.R. 779, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1989), rev'd on
other grounds, 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
188. Id. at 793-94.
189. Id.
1993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [
claim for itself a greater share of the debtor's limited assets.'9
According to LTV, such an attempt by the PBGC frustrated the
two major purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the equal treat-
ment of creditors and the fresh-start principle for debtors.19'
The PBGC denied that its restoration constituted an auto-
matic stay violation and contended, in any event, that its action
was protected by the regulatory enforcement exception to the
stay found in section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.192 The
PBGC argued that its restoration did not violate section
362(a)(1)'s prohibition against pre-petition administrative pro-
ceedings because this restoration could not have begun prior to
LTV's bankruptcy.193 Further, the PBGC asserted that the lia-
bility of LTV triggered by restoration did not arise until post-
petition and thus was not an impermissible act to collect a pre-
petition debt under section 362(a)(6).194 Finally, the PBGC
contended that its restoration was exempt from the stay under
section 362(b)(4) as a proceeding by a governmental unit to en-
force its police or regulatory power.195
The district court in LTV, while ultimately denying
PBGC's restoration of the pension plan on administrative law
grounds, more or less agreed with all of the PBGC's arguments
concerning the automatic stay. The court said it did not believe
that restoration would violate the stay, because section 362 pro-
hibited only those actions taken directly against property of the
bankruptcy estate.196 In this case, the court noted, a restoration
by LTV would not result in immediate involuntary payments
by LTV to the PBGC, nor would it cause a direct change in the
possession or control of any of LTV's assets.197
On the applicability of the government regulatory excep-
tion of section 362(b)(4), the district court disagreed with LTV's
contentions that the primary purpose of this action was pecuni-
190. Id. at 794.
191. Id. (citing In re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 701 F.2d 1071, 1075 n.8 (2d
Cir.), cer. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Id
196. Id- at 802-03.
197. Id. at 800-01. Specifically, the district court pointed out that restora-
tion in a bankruptcy proceeding does not by itself require the debtor's compli-
ance with minimum funding payments. Id at 802. The reason, the court said,
is that the provisions of ERISA "which set forth the minimum funding obliga-
tions... are expressly subordinated to other non-ERISA federal laws, like the
[Bankruptcy] Code." Id at 800 n.16 (citation omitted).
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ary and that the action was thereby removed from the ambit of
the exception. 98 This argument, the court said, proved too
much.1' Any action that the PBGC takes will in a sense be pe-
cuniary, the court observed, but the PBGC's inherent financial
interests are simply surrogates for the pensioners whose rights
it insures. 200 Thus, the court concluded, the PBGC's pecuniary
interest will almost necessarily be a proper public interest for
purposes of the section 362(b)(4) exception to the stay.201
When the Second Circuit heard the restoration case on ap-
peal, it commented only briefly on the question of the auto-
matic stay. Without much elaboration, the appeals court said
that it was "less convinced than the district court" that the res-
toration did not implicate a violation of the stay in the first in-
stance.20 2 But even if restoration did violate section 362(a), the
appellate court said, it was clear that restoration qualified for
an exemption from the stay under section 362(b)(4). 20 3 After
all, Congress's stated purpose in enacting ERISA was to protect
the public welfare and the "'continued well-being and security
of millions of employees"' who participate in defined benefit
pensions plans.20 4 According to the court, there was no ques-
tion that restoration directly furthered those ends and thus fit
within the stay exception. 205
Despite the above statements of the district and appellate
courts, the PBGC has lost one stay battle in the restoration
arena. Following the PBGC's restoration victory at the
Supreme Court, the PBGC and the IRS published regulations
that governed the minimum funding requirements for restored
plans.206 Pursuant to these regulations, the PBGC proposed a
repayment schedule to amortize the LTV plans' unfunded lia-
bility.20 7 LTV responded by requesting the district court to is-
sue a declaratory judgment that the "proposed repayment
schedule not be used ... to compel [the] payment of pension
198. I& at 806.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 803-06.
202. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 875 F.2d 1008, 1020 (2d Cir.
1989), rev'd on other grounds, 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
203. Id.
204. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988)).
205. Id.
206. LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),
130 B.R. 690, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 42,704, 42,713 (Oct. 23,
1990)).
207. Id.
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plan obligations outside of a plan for reorganization. '20 8
The Department of Labor (DOL), the entity charged with
enforcing compliance with minimum funding requirements, ar-
gued along with the PBGC that the DOL's enforcement of the
payment schedule against LTV would be exempted from the
stay pursuant to section 362(b)(4). 20 9 The district court dis-
agreed, however, holding that "not every act by the DOL is one
to protect the public health and welfare."210 According to the
court, these actions by the DOL to enforce the funding obliga-
tions of the plans protected a purely pecuniary interest and
thus did not fit within the regulatory exception to the stay.21-
For stay purposes, then, courts have attempted to distin-
guish between the act of restoration and the actual enforce-
ment of a restoration's financial obligations. The courts in LTV
viewed the restoration act as the mere re-establishment of lia-
bility, which either fails to implicate the stay at all or fits
within the regulatory exception. By contrast, once the restora-
tion of a pension plan is in place, the DOL, as the enforcer of
pension funding obligations, will not be allowed to compel pay-
ment during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. Undoubt-
edly, the DOL can, like the PBGC, point to its crucial role in
implementing the laudable policies of ERISA. That fact, how-
ever, did not change the district court's view in LTV that insist-
ing on the debtor's current funding obligations was
nevertheless a prohibited act to recover a debt from the
estate.2
12
B. LIEN CREATION AND ENFORCEMENT
As discussed earlier, the PBGC has access to a number of
liens that enable it to place its claims before those of other
creditors. These liens include one for plan asset insufficiency,
another for missed funding contributions, and a third through
the IRS for granting a funding waiver in a given year.2 13
Historically, the PBGC's liens have not proven to be as
great an advantage as they might seem. One of the greatest
limitations on the utility of PBGC liens has been the automatic
stay. Specifically, section 362(a)(4) stays "any act to create, per-
208. IH
209. I& at 700.
210. Id
211. I&
212. See id
213. See supra part III.A.
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fect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate. ' 21 4
The PBGC's most significant lien, the one that attaches to its
plan asset insufficiency claim, does not even arise until plan
termination. Pension plan terminations, however, typically oc-
cur only when the plan sponsor is already in bankruptcy.2 1 5
Another of the PBGC's liens, the lien for delinquent fund-
ing contributions, is created automatically. That lien arises
once sixty days have passed following the plan sponsor's failure
to make a scheduled payment, as long as the missed payment
puts the employer's total delinquent funding contributions over
the $1 million mark.2 1 6 Even this lien, however, must be per-
fected like a tax lien prior to bankruptcy for it to be effective
against the trustee in bankruptcy. 21 7 As the bankruptcy court
in the LTV case pointed out, just as tax liens are prevented by
the automatic stay from arising post-petition by operation of
law, so too are the PBGC liens that Congress chose to treat like
tax liens.2 18
Conceivably the PBGC could argue that its post-petition
lien creation or lien perfection is exempted from the bank-
ruptcy stay by the section 362(b)(4) regulatory exception. That
exception, however, does not apply to cases in which the gov-
ernmental unit's exercise of its regulatory power is meant to
serve primarily a pecuniary interest. As noted above, the dis-
trict court in LTV drew a distinction between the PBGC's res-
toration action and the DOL's attempt to enforce the minimum
funding requirements arising from restoration.
The court allowed the restoration act itself under the regu-
latory exception because it merely established the existence
and amount of LTV's funding obligations.21 9 The court deemed
the effort by the DOL in Chapter 11 to enforce those obliga-
tions outside of a confirmed plan, however, to be an impermissi-
ble act to collect a debt.220 Similarly, an attempt by the PBGC
to create or perfect a lien in bankruptcy would go beyond the
mere establishment of a plan sponsor's liability. Rather, such
214. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1988).
215. See Daniels, supra note 29, at 80.
216. See 29 U.S.C. § 1082(f) (1988).
217. See id.
218. LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),
115 B.R. 760, 780-81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
219. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 87 B.R. 779, 800-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), qff'd, 875 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1989),
rev'd on other grounds, 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
220. See LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 130 B.R. 690, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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an action by the PBGC would involve increasing the priority of
an already-established claim against the employer. That brand
of leap-frogging by one creditor over another is precisely what
the automatic stay was designed to prevent.
C. PLAN TERMINATION
Another weapon in the PBGC's enforcement arsenal that
implicates the automatic stay is the PBGC's ability to terminate
a pension plan involuntarily. Termination gives rise to the
PBGC's claim for plan asset insufficiency by essentially acceler-
ating all of the past service liabilities that the plan sponsor was
able to amortize at the plan's inception.221
In considering whether plan termination by the PBGC vio-
lates the stay, the distinction between liability establishment
and liability collection must be revisited. Post-petition plan ter-
mination seems quite similar to plan restoration in that it sim-
ply establishes a liability to the PBGC that was contingent at
the point of the employer's bankruptcy filing. Thus, like plan
restoration, the PBGC's involuntarily plan termination should
either not violate the stay in the first instance or clearly qualify
for the section 362(b)(4) exception. Just in case anyone had
any doubts on this question, ERISA specifically excepts from
the coverage of the automatic stay any involuntary termina-
tions of pension plans by the PBGC.222
D. ACTIONS BY PARTIES OTHER THAN THE PBGC
When a plan sponsor files for bankruptcy, there may be
parties other than the PBGC who will have pension-related
claims against the debtor. As noted earlier, because of recent
statutory changes, plan beneficiaries probably no longer have
an independent right to sue their employer for the difference
between the amount of their originally promised pension bene-
fits and those benefits covered by the PBGC guarantee. Never-
theless, plan beneficiaries may have separate breach of
fiduciary duty actions against pension plan fiduciaries, who are
often upper-level managers of the sponsoring employer.
Such was the case in LTV, where pension plan participants
sought to pursue actions against certain LTV executives outside
of the context of bankruptcy.223 Because these managers were
221. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
222. See 29 U.S.C. § 1342(e) (1988).
223. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 76 B.R. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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not "the debtor," the automatic stay of section 362 did not by its
own terms prevent the continuation of the non-bankruptcy
lawsuits. Despite the lack of protection from section 362, how-
ever, LTV convinced the bankruptcy court to invoke section
105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code as a means to enjoin these pen-
sion actions that were pending in various state courts. 22 Sec-
tion 105(a) is a catch-all provision that grants to the bankruptcy
court the power to issue "any order, process or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this ti-
tle."225 Some courts have used section 105(a) to extend the
reach of the automatic stay to protect co-defendants of the
debtor where those co-defendants are somehow thought to be
essential to the reorganization of the debtor.226 This must have
been the logic of the bankruptcy court in LTV when it agreed
at LTV's behest to issue a blanket injunction prohibiting these
related pension actions against parties other than LTV itself.227
The district court in LTV disagreed with the bankruptcy
court's broad interpretation of section 105(a) in this context. It
held that LTV should not be entitled to this blanket injunction
simply by asserting, as it had, that lawsuits against manage-
ment would divert its time away from a successful reorganiza-
tion.228 The court conceded that LTV was certainly entitled to
a stay of these related actions to the extent that it was liable as
a co-fiduciary of these pension plans.229 The source of that
stay, however, would be section 362 rather than section
105(a).230
The district court did not foreclose the possibility that sec-
tion 105(a) could come to the aid of the besieged LTV plan fidu-
ciaries. But, the court said, such an application of section 105(a)
would require a more particularized showing of potential harm
than had been made thus far by LTV. Specifically, the court
found, LTV would need to show that its efforts to address the
pension plan problems through its reorganization outweighed
the interests of plan participants in pursuing their actions in
224. See id at 946-47.
225. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
226. See Barry L. Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 213, 215 (1988) (discussing bankruptcy courts' use of equita-
ble powers under § 105 to stay actions against co-debtors).
227. See Chateaugay, 76 B.R. at 946.
228. I& at 948-49.
229. I& at 951.
230. See id at 949-52.
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non-bankruptcy forums.2s1
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that each of the PBGC's re-
cent efforts to secure for itself a higher position in bankruptcy
has met with very limited success at the judicial level. Despite
the PBGC's aggressive arguments at both the bankruptcy court
and district court levels, the federal pension insurer has been
unable to convince courts that current la'ws give the agency the
liens and priorities that it believes its claims deserve. It is not
surprising, then, that the PBGC now seeks a legislative change
to achieve what it could not achieve through litigation. Specifi-
cally, the PBGC has been fighting for the enactment of a law
that would give the federal pension agency a priority position in
bankruptcy.232 This approach, however, ignores a number of
realities. First, bankruptcy is not the place to solve the
problems of underfunding, since it was outside of bankruptcy
that the PBGC allowed the underfunding to occur. Second,
creating a bankruptcy priority for retirees will likely accelerate
the financial demise of companies most guilty of underfunding
by restricting their access to credit both before and after a
bankruptcy filing. Finally, giving a special priority to retiree
benefits necessarily reduces the bankruptcy recovery of other
claimants, many of whom are arguably in groups as worthy of
sympathy as are the retirees.
A more sensible solution to the PBGC's current problems
in bankruptcy would be to adjust the non-bankruptcy law be-
hind the PBGC's massive deficit. Specifically, Congress ought
to re-examine the wisdom of having the PBGC guarantee past
service benefits that an employer is currently allowed to amor-
tize over thirty years. It is the insurance of these past service
benefits, and not the Bankruptcy Code, that is the true cause of
the current pension crisis. Accordingly, if there is to be legisla-
tive tinkering to benefit the financial position of the PBGC, it
ought to be with ERISA and not with the Bankruptcy Code.
231. Id. at 952.
232. See Pension Protection Legislation, supra note 120, at 48 (describing
legislation introduced by Rep. Rod Chandler (R-Wash.) that would give the
PBGC a higher priority in bankruptcy cases); see also Rosenthal, OMB Propo-
sal, supra note 2, at 1081 (noting that the Office of Management and Budget
proposed remedying the PBGC's financial problems by giving it an enhanced
position in bankruptcy).
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